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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

JOHN

~I.L~Rl(HAM,

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMEiNT OF FACTS
The facts of the case are quite fully set forth in
Appellant's Brief and, with a fe'v exceptions which
\vill be later set forth, are agreed to by the respond·
ent. Because, hov1ever7 there are some points of
fact which are considered important and which are
not emphasized in Appellant's Brief, and because
the nature of the question raised on appeal is, such
that the facts are of paramount importance, and
further since Appellant's Brief is typewritten, it is
deemed advisable to, at least briefly, restate the
facts here in printed form.
The defendant was. convicted of the crime or
murder in the first degree, with a jury recommen .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

dation of life imprisonment. The court, however,
in the exercise of its statutory judicial discretion,
declined to follow the recommendation of the jury
and rendered judgment sentencing the defendant
to death.
'l1he crime \vas committed, and all of the other acts

n1entioned in this statement o{ fact occurred, in
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Sta.te of Utah,
except where otherwise herein specifically in·
dicated.
The State obtained . a written ·confession in defendant's own handwriting, (Exhibit 0) and another confession by way of questions propounded
by Salt Lake County Attorney Harold E. Wallace,
and answers given by the defendant (Exhibit P).
There was also testimony given by W. E.· Eggles·
ton, a ·Salt Lake City police officer, concerning
several conversations had with the defendant,
wherein defendant admitted the commission of the
crime and described how he had accomplished it.
The State's evidence showed that the defendant, a
male, 24 years of age, had worked at various times
during a period of about two years from 1937 as a
porter and shoe-shiner in the Mcintyre Building
and in a shoe-shine par ior near that building. Dur·
ing this period, defendant became acquainted with
the deceased, J. G. Smith, who, for about five years
prior to his death, was the o\vner and operator of a.
candy and cigar counter in the lobby of the McIntyre Building. On the afternoon of November
25, 1939, defendant was in the vicinity of the Me·
Intyre Building, although he was not working there.
It was during this time that he conceived the idea
and formulated his plans to rob Mr. Smith. The
defendant was seen leaving the Mcintyre Building
at about 6 P. M., on the date mentioned. From hi~
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approximately two years' acquaintance with Mr.
Sn1ith and fron1 his 'vork in the lVlcintyre Building,
defendant "·as 'Yell acquainted with the habits of
Mr. Smith. He knew that Srnith would close his
stand at about 8 P. 11., place the day's receipts in
a money sack, place this sack in his lunch box and
walk to his home in a direction easterly o:ri South
Temple Street to '' J'' Street and then north on '' J''
Street.
The robbery was deliberately and coldly planned
and having determined to commit that crime, the
defendant went to his home where he had some·
thing to eat and then went to the rear of his hon1e
for the particular and special purpose of searchil}g
for and obtaining a 'veapon. (Tr. 259). Deliberate
ly he chose for this purpose an iron pipe, (Exhibit
G) - a weapon which, if used, might easily be expected to kill. Having procured this lethal weapon,
he placed it in his pocket. He then proceeded to
''J" Street between 1st and 2nd Avenues, where
he lingered in the darkness until about 9 P. M.,
when he sa\V ~{r. Smith turn off South Temple and
walk north on '~ J" Street. Defendant then concealed himself behind a tree. \Vhen Mr. Smith hau
passed slightly beyond this tree, the defendant
lunged for and seized hold of the lunch box carried
by ~Jr. Smith. The latter refused to release his
hold on the lunch box and a struggle ensued, during
the course of ,vhich the defendant took the iron pipe
fron1 his pocket and with it struck Mr. Smith over
the head three or four times. Mr. Smith then fell
and the defendant seized the lunch box and ran fron1
the scene of the crime to a vacant lot on Sixth East
Street between Third and Fourth South Streets,
where he removed the money, about $20,00, from
the luncl1 box. Mr. Smith was picked up by two
persons nnd taken to the Emergenry IIospital,
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later being removed to the- Holy Cross Hospital,
wh.ere he died on November 28, 1939. According
to testimony of Dr. Charles F. Pinkerton, the
cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage and pres·
sure ·caused by a skull fracture, resulting from
blows with a blunt instrument. (Tr. 193). Defendant was apprehended and at first denied commis·
sion of the offense but later repudiated his deniaJ
and signed the written confessions (Exhibits 0 and
P) on December 2, 1939.
During the course of the trial, defendant did not
deny responsibility for the homicide, and no evi·
dence toward such denial '\Vas introduced or proffered in his behalf. In fact, his counsel frankly
admitted that the homicide was committed by the
defendant (Tr. 329). The evidence in behalf of the
defendant related almost entirely to the back~
ground, past history and degree of mentality of the
defendant. It was shown that the defendant was
one of six children whose father died when the de~
fendant '\Vas thirteen years of age. In Appellant's
.Brief (page 4) it is indicated that from the time thP
defendant's father died, defendant's n1other was
.forced to work for the support of herself and her
children, thus leaving the children, including the
defendHnt, more or less to shift for themselves and
to do as they pleased. The evidence, however,
shows tha.t the defendant continued his schooling
at the West ,Jordan elementary school for three
years after his father's death and until he '\Vas. 16
years of age, and that until that time, his mother
did not work for wages, except intermittently, ~nd
hence was not forced to neglect her children during
that period. (Tr. 301). The defendant was taken
from either the 7th or 8th grade at the West Jordan
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School add placed in the State Industrial School at
Ogden, Utah. (Tr. 309).
While it appears to be true that the defendant was
deprived of many of the good things of life, we can
find nothing in the record to show that the defendant had at any time lacked or wanted for the necessities of life, and the assertion that the defendant's
life was one of want and deprivation is not warranted by the record. It is true the testin1ony indicated that, after his marriag-e, defendant's prin.
cipal snurce of income was from shining shoes and
work on W. P. A., but the amount of ~oney received from those sources is not shown. Certainly
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the
defendant's family life, either before or after his
marriage, was such as to cause him to consider
lightly and underestimate the duties of citizenship
and the responsibility and consequences incident to
breaking the la-\vs of the society in which he lived.
The defendant, himself, did. not contend that the
robbery was planned or committed because his family was in want. He stated he did it to obtain money
with which to pay for a washing machine, which he
had previously purchased. The defendant remained in the Industrial School for a period of
about 18 1nonths. Shortly after his. release from
that institution, he got into trouble and was charged
with burglary, to V{hich charge he pleaded guilty,
and was confined at the Utah State Penitentiary
for six months. When released from the peniten ..
tiary he was 21 years of age. He then married and
was living with his wife and two children at the
time this offense was -committed.
The question of insanity was not an issue in the
case, and it was not contended that the defendant
was incapable of having the necessary cri1nina1 inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tent; or that he did not know right from wrong; or
that he was motivated by some cause that he could
not resist. (Tr. 323).
Mr. Mark K. Allen, Psychologist of the -utah State
Training School and Dr. H. H. Ramsey, S_up-erintendent of tha.t institution, testified concerning
defendant's degree of mentality. The qualifications
of both of thes.e men to testify concerning that subject is admitted. Mr. Allen uses the New Stanford
Revision of the Binet Analysis Test, and previously
had given this test to over 1,000 persons. According to 1\fr. Allen, the normal mental age of an individual twenty-four years of age, chronologically,
is fifteen, and an individual, in taking this intelligence test, vvould have to achieve an intelligence
quotient (i. q.) of 100 in order to be classed as normal. Dr. Ramsey testified that an intelligence
quotient of 90 to 110 is normal. Mr. Allen gave the
defendant one test and concluded that he has an intelligence quotient of 67, indicating that his mental
ability, as compared with that of a normal individual was 67 p-ercent of what it should be; that
his mental age was ten; and that he would be classified as a moron. In other words, that his mental
development was retarded about one-third.
In making these tests no symptoms of insanity
were found. (Tr. 351). Dr. Ramsey gave the defendant no test but did spend some time with defendant in observing him, and from such observation, coupled \vith his knowledge of the results of
the test given by l\fr. Allen, reached substantially
the same ·conclusions as. did Mr. Allen. These witnesses expressed the opinion that the defendant's
degree of m~ntality was the same on the day of the
o~ime as it was on the day the 'intelligence test was
given.
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ARGUMENT
.A.s a basis for appeal the defendant assigned two
errors, one of which, ho,vever, 'vas abandoned, the
only assignment of error argued in .l\ppellant ''s
Brief being as follows:
''The trial court abused its discretion and
erred in refusing and failing to follov{
the recommendation of the jury contained
in their verdict that the defendant be im~
prisoned in the State Prison at hard labor
for life.''
It may be here stated that the case is one of first
ins.tanc.e in this Court bearing upon the question
here presented.
Section 103-28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, provides :
''Every person guilty of murder in the
first degree sha.ll suffer death, or upon the
recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the State Prison
for life, in the discretion of the ·conrt . . . "
Counsel for appellant concede that where a defend.
ant is convicted of murder in the first degree with
recommendation of life imprisonment, it is not mandatory upon the trial court to follow such a recom~
mendation. The language of the statute a.bove
quoted is so clear that it admits of no doubt in this
res.pect. Furthermore, this Court in
State v. Morris, 44 Ut. 31; 122 P. 380,
in commenting upon the right of the jury to make
a recommendation of life imprisonment, states:
''If such a recommendation is made, the
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court has the discretion to impose the death
penalty or such an imprisonment.''
In the face of the clear right of the trial court in its
discretion to disregard the jury's recommendation,
appellant urges that the trial court in this case
abused its discretion in so doing to such an extent
that this Court has the po,ver to, and should, inter·
fere by reversing and reducing the sentence im·
posed from death to life imprisonment. With re·
gard to the power of this Court to so modify the
sentence, app·ellant refers to
Seetion 105-43-3, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, which reads as follows:
''The Court may reverse, affirm or modify
the judgment or order appealed fro1n, and
may set aside, affirm or modify any or all
the proceedings subsequent to or dependent
upon such judgment or order, and may, if
proper, order a new trial.''
Tha.t statute, too, is clear,· and the State ·concedes
that this Court has the power to reverse or modify
a judgment of a lower court, where proper legal
cause exists for such reversal or modification; but
it is our contention, and we sincerely and firmly
urge that the power to so reverse or modify a judg·
ment is limited to cages wherein it clearly appears
from the record on appeal that prejudicial error
was committed by the court below. It is the State'"
further belief and contention that the exercise of
a discretion specifically and clearly vested by
statute in. a lower court, in the manner exercised
·by the court in this case, is not and cannot be such
an error as would warrant an interference by this
Court, even though this Court might be inclined to
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disagree in principle with the action of the court
below.
In considering~ the general question of appellate re·
view of judicial discretion exercised by lower courts,
the rule is well established that an Appellate Court
cannot interfere with discretionary powers of a
court below and decisions made pursuant to the ex·
ercise of such powers, unless it clearly appears from
the record that th-e trial court abused the discretion
vested in it.
Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586; 113 P.
370.
As stated in
Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 Utah
379 ; 60 p. 1021.
where this Court was ·considering the refusal of the
lower court to permit an experiment:
''The presiding judge exercised a discretionary power, and his decision, except in
cases of palpable abuse of discretion will
not be reviewed by an A p~pella te Court.''
See also
Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 44 Utah 100:
138 P. 1185.
State v. Webb, 18 Utah 441; 56 P. 159.
Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314; 268 P.
526.
In Re Yo,vell 's Estate, 75 Utah 312; 285
P. 285.
N a.isbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah 575; 290 P.
950.
And where, in connection with a question involving
an exercise of discretion, reasonable minds might
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draw different conclusions, then the finding of the
District Court is binding.
Knight v. Wessler, 67 Utah 354; 248 P. 132.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
State v. State ex rel. Shull (1930), 286
P. 891,
defined ''abuse of judicia] discretion,'' as follows:
''Abuse of judicial discretion is a discretion
exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and
evidence. ' '
In Jaggy, et ux. v. Rooney, et ux., 112 P.
367,
the SupTeme Court of Washington stated:
''The Court's action upon discretionary
and advisory matters is not subject to review is this Court, since we .have no way of
determining the ·effect of such matters
upon the mind of the Court, or to \vhat extent, if any, his judgment has be·en influenced or based upon such matters.''
;Conceding the power of 3n Appellate Court to review and modify de-cisions made by a lower court
in the exercise of a discretionary power, where it
can be clearly established from the record that the
court's decision is arbitrary and clearly against
reason and the evidence, in order to determine
whether or not there has been such an abuse of dis .
cretion as to \Varra.nt interference by an Appellate
Court, the facts developed and adduced at the trial
must be carefully and thoroughly examined. It is
upon the facts that such a question must be de·
termined. With this in mind, let us consider the
cases cited and discussed in appellant's brief in the
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order in 'Yllich they there appear. It is believed
that an examination of the ·cases so cited will dis~
close that the facts in those cases are such as to
make them clearly distinguishable from the case
here before this Court and to make the decisions in
such cited cases inap·plicable in the instant ·case.
Appellant's brief (p~a.ge 8). refers to the case of
Fritz v. State, 12'8 Pac. 170,
wherein the Oklahoma Court set forth the
propositi2n that the power of the Appellate
Court to modify a sentence from death to
life imprisonment is in no sense a power of commutation, and hencP does not conflict "\\rith the executive prerogatiYc of granting of clemency. There
is no doubt that these two powers are, in their
nature, entirely different and separate, and it is
1he State's belief that they should be kept separate
in fact. When, upon the record, it appears that
error has been committed by the court below prejudicial to the defendant's rights, it may be proper
for the- Appellate Court to modify a judgment.
However, it seems too obvious to admit of argument that, in the absence of error of record on the
part of the court below, any reduction by an Appellate Court of a sentence imposed below is, in fact,
an exercise of thp nower of commutation, call it
what you may. It is the facts in the case which
must determine 'vhrther a modifieation of a judg~
ment helow is a proper exercise of Appellate Court
power or whether such modification is, in fact, an
improper exercise of the po"Ter of commutation.
With respect to the action of the Oklahoma Court in
reducing the sentence in the cas,e of
Fritz v. State; supra,
it is pertinent to note that the facts in that case
were very different from those in t.lie case now
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before this Court. The words of the Court therein
1ndicate that after. considering all the evidence, the
Court had s.ome small doubt as to whether or not
the defendant was actually guilty of the murder,
and hence the possibility existed that an innocent
man had been condemned to die. The Court said :
''We think that under all the circumstances,
as shown by all the evidence, Thelma and
Jeff Morgan were accomplices of the defendant and when \ve consider the fact that
the murder of Watson occurred on September 14, and in 14 days from that tin1e the
defendant was put upon trial, and that the
o-rder appointing counsel to defend him
was made only two days before the trial,
and the fact that the deceased was a white
man and the defendant a negro, and the
further fact that although Watson, the deceased} lived until the following day,· he
failed to make any _statement or declaration as to how his injuries were received,
it is our opinion, takfng all these circumstances of the case into consideration, that
it would be an injustice, the Nlorgans having been allowed to go free, to affirm the
judgment and sentence.''
In the case of Owen v. State, 163 Pac. 548, referred
to on page 9 of appellant's brief, the Oklahoma
court modified the sentence to avoid reversing or
remanding the case for a new trial because of error
committed in the lo\ver court, which error was prejudicial to defendant's rights. The cas.e, therefore~
is clearly distinguishable from the instant case and
.js jnapplicable here.
In Chambers v. State] 182 Pac. 714,
the Oklahoma case mentioned on page 10 of appelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lant 's brief, the Court, in reducing the penalty fron1
death to life imprisonment1 stated:
'' . . . 'j_,he undisputed facts are that the
defendant and the deceased· 'vere at all
times intimate and familiar 'vith each
other; there 'vas no evidence of any animosity bet,veen them. While the defendant's intoxication is no excuse for the
crime committed, it is a fact tending to
throw light on other facts and circumstances in the case, and at most the evidence tending to show premeditated design
to take life is very weak and unsatisfactory.''

There, again, we have a case where the Court after
considering all the evidence expressed some doubt
as to whether or not all the elements of the crime
charged had been completely established. No su(l.h
circumstance~ prevail in the ca8e now before this
Court.
In Anthony v. State, 159 Pa.c. 934,
cited on page 10 of appellant's brief, the Oklahoma
Court, in n1odifying the sentence, stated:

"It is fair inference from the facts and
eircumstanccs in evidence in this case that
the defendant 1.vas provoked by the conduct of his ·w·ifes the probable effect of
w·hich conduct 'vould be to cause their
daughter to lead an immoral life, as the
defendant believed. While the })rovocation wa.s not sufficient to reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter in the
first degree, yet, considering the state of
thP defendant's mind at the time the homiride "·as . committed, and . it appearing
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that the testilnonv of the two eye-,vitnesses
involved inconsistencies and contradictions
which it is needless to point out, we are of
the opinion that the jury abused its discretion in assessing the death penalty, and
that for this reason the judgment and sentence should be modified to imprisonment
in the penitentiary for life, at hard labor."
Again we have a case where the Appellate Court,
after considering the evidence, indicated a doubt as
to the credibility of important testimony, plus the
additional element of great provocation, and hence
the possibility existed that an innocent man had
been condemned to die. In the case here before
the Court neither -of these elements are present.
In Peters v. State, 211 Pac. 427,
cited on page 10 of ap'Pellant 's brief, the fact~
showed that defendant had previously been con·
victed of manslaughter in the first degree and sen·
tenced to ten years in the penitentiary. He was
dissatisfied with that sentence and sought and ob·
tained a new trial, the result of which was the ver·
diet of murder and the sentence of death. In his
brief, the Attorney General of the State of Okla:
homa referred to these facts and recommended 1·e~
duction of the pena.lty. Renee, here again we find
extenuating circumstances and reasons for reduc,
tion of the sentence 'vhich are not present in the
instant case.
It will he observed that all of the cases cited by
appellant and thus far herein co1nmented upon can1e
from the Oklahoma .A.ppella.te Courts. It is there·
fore pertinent to call attention to the languaP-"e of
the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma i~
Barnett v. State (Okla., 1923), 219 P. 726,
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"Thich is a later case than any Oklahoma case cited
by appellant, to~t:
"Before this Court would be authorized to
modify the judgrnent, some substantial
error of law should be shown.''
Ray v. State, 67 S. W. 553,·
which is relied upon strongly by the appellant, is a
Tennessee case wherein the defendant was con·
victed of murder in the first degree, the jury, however.) finding mitigating circumstances. The -court
disregarded the recommendation of the jury and
sentenced the defendant to death. The Appellate
f;ourt modified the judgment and reduced the
sentence to life imprisonment. It is pertinent to
point out, ho\vever, t~at in tha.t case, the evidence
:::.howed a possibility of provocation and also the
possibility that the deceased had threatened the life
of the defendant.
In State v. Ramirez, 203 Pac. 279,
(cited on page 12 of appellant's brief as State v
R,amuez), the Idaho Court stated:
"The verdict V\ras based to a great extent
upon the testi1nony of one Garcia, "\Vh(nn
the appellant charged with murder. The
testimony, actionB, and Btatements of the
\Yi tness, as sho"rn in the record, are of
such character that we have grave rcisgivings about the infliction of the death
penalty. ' '
Here again is an instance 'vhere . because of doubt
as to the credibility of a witness at the trial, the
possibility existed that an innocent 1nan had been
sent0:~red to death.
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In the case of
_Commonwealth of Pa. v. Garramone, 161
Atl. 733J
referred to in appellant's brief on page 13, the
Court said:
"It is clear that this -vvas not an atrocious
murder, planned and committed in cold
blood, or one ·committed in the p~e~petra
tion of robbery or other grave criine,
though, by saying so, we do not intend to
enumerate all possible examples of the
class that should receive sentence of death,
or otherwi8e attempt to distinguish one
class from another; definition may come,
as ·cases present themselves. This is the
case of an· industrious man without crim.
inal record, whose character as a peace·
ful, law-abiding citizen was testified to by
a number of persons. After he return~d
from his day's work and found his wife
and s.on in the condition described, he committed the crin1e under the resulting provocation, and in circumstance which, 've
think, place him within the· legislative
classification, requiring the milder of the
tvvo possible sentences.''
This, then, is another cas.e where the defendant
acted under the stress of great passion and pro .
vocation. Also the Court indicates that had tho
murder been committed while attem:pting a. rnbbery, leniency would have been denied. Clearly the
case differs from the one now under consideration
in this Court. 'rhis same Pennsylvania Court In
the later case of
Commonwealth v. Sterling (Pa., 1934), 170
Atl. 258,
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where defendant comn1itted murder 'vhile atte1npt·
ing a robbery, distinguished that case on the facts
from
Commonwealth v. Garramone, supra,
·and refused to reduce the penalty from death to
life imprisonment.
In the case of
Muzik v. State, 156 N. W. 1056,
the evidence upon which the Court commented
showed that the defendant had, for about a. year
prior to the commission of the crime, been acting
queerly, and that he behaved in a most unusual
manner after the crime was accomplished. The
Court in addition to the language quoted in appellant's brief, stated:
''Owing to the defendant's mental condition, there may be great doubts as to his
responsibility for his actions at the timP. of
the tragedy, and yet he is neither an idiot,
an imbecile nor a maniac. ''
There is no evide·nce in the case no\v before this
Court that the defendant's mental condition was
such that he \va.s not responsible for his actions at
the time the murder was. committed, and neither the
defendant nor his counsel contended at the trial
that such was the case.
In the case of
Cryderman v. State, 161 N. W. 1045,
referred to on page 15 of appellant's brief, tne
Nebraska Supreme Court stated, referring to defendant:
''He testified that he had been in the hospital for s.everal v;reeks and was 'taken in
charge for being crazy.' . . . The crime
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was not committed for p:rofit or gain. No
rational motive appears. . . . If his mind
was not wholly deranged, it was not normal, and was not entirely reliable as a
regulator of his conduct.''

In Schwartz v. State, 225 N. W. 766, cited on page
15 of appellant's brief, the facts show that the de .
fendant \Vas a drug addict. l-Ie had been without
drugs for a considerable time and his need for
drugs was so intense that he was very ill. He entered a drug store for the purpose of obtaining
drugs by robberl. Deceased was shot and killed
during the attempted robbery. The jury imposed
the death p:enalty. Without endeavoring to condone the use of drugs or to excuse the crime committed by the defendant, the Nebraska Appellate
Court discussed in detail the great need of defend.
ant for some drug to alle-viate his _suffering and
the almost irresistible force which u~ged him to
procure drugs at any cost. The Appellate Court
accordingly felt the penalty wa.s too s.evere and reduced it to life imprisonment. In the instant case,
no such circumstances existed and no irresistible
pressure compelled John Markharn to rob and
murder J. G. Smith.
It is believed the foregoing discussion will serve
to show that the cases cited by appellant are in-·
applicable and not binding upon this Court in determining the question presented in the instant
case. Let us, therefore, now consider further the
question of app·ellate review of discretionary findings and acts of lower courts, and examine some
eases \Vherein Appellate Courts have declined to
interfere with such findings and acts.
\Vith respect to the general question as to whether
nn .A_ ppella te Court will revie\v or revise the trial
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court '8 rulings concerning matters \Vi thin the latter's discretion, it is stated in
Corpu8 J-uris Secundum, Vol. 5, page 472:
'~As

a general rule, if there ba~ not been
a clear abuse of dis-cretion resulting to the
complaining· party's prejudice, the Appellate Court will not review or revise the
t1·ial court's action or rulings with ref·
erence to matters resting in the latter's
judicial dis.cretion. Great \veight is a,ccord·
ingly g'iven to the judgment of the trial ,
court on discretionary matters .
''
(Citing nu1nerous cases including the Utah
case) Campbell v. Union Savings & Invest·
ment Company, 63 Ut. 366; 226 Pac. 190).
In the sa1ne works and volume at page 476, it
stated:

IS

''In determining whether the lovver court
has abused its discretion the question is
not whether the reyiewing court agrees
"rith the court below but rather whether
it believes that a judicial mind, in view of
the relevant rules of law applicable to the
particular case and on due consideration of
all the circumstances, could reasonably
have reached the conclusion of the court
belo\v. 'rhe me1·e fact that the Appellate
Court would haYe decided otherwise does
not establish that the discretion has been
abused, nor does a mere mistake or error
of law.''
vVhere there is a question of abuse of
cretion an Appellate Court should
doubt in favor of the proper exercise
court's' discretionary power, and the

judicial disresolve the
of the trial
complaining
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party has the burden of showing a prejudicial
abuse of discretion which must plainly appear trom
the record. See
Wilder v. Wilder, 7 Pac. (2d) 1032; also
City of Victor, et al, v. Halstead (1928
Col.), 271 .Pac. 185.
In an annotation at
89 A. L. R. 299, the following language
appears:
''Before the Ap·pellate Court is authorized
to modify a judgment or conviction by a
reduction of the punishment imposed, it
must clearly appear that the punishment
imposed is ex·cessive or probably the result of passion and prejudice on the part
of the trial jury, or else that son1e substantial error of law has occurred at the
trial prejudicial to the defendant in the
amount of punishment imposed."
Citing Barnett v. State) supra.
The record shows that the trial court was exceptionally lenient in admitting evidence in behalf of
defendant, to assure that nothing would be kept out
which. might possibly have a. bearing upon the degree. of defendant's guilt. In permitting such testimony a good deal of evidence was given concerning defendant's background, antecedent life and
degree of mentality. Our law recognizes insanity
as a defense to criminal acts, but there is nothing
in our laws which distinguishes, for purposes of
punishment, between persons of high mentality and
those of low· mentality, short of insanity. Any
recommendation of the jury made upon the basis
of defendant.'s background or degree of mentality
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tnust have been based upon sympathy for him. A
jury should not reconunend the defendant to the
leniency of the court because of Inere sy1npa.thy.
State v. I.ee, (Del.), 171 Atl. 195.
At Page 526, Vol. 4, vVarren on Homicide,
this statement appears:
"Regarding the matter of recommending
life imprisonment, the jury should consider
the evidence bearing upon his guilt and
innocence. Evidence relating to his past
life and antecedent background should be
excluded.''

In State v. Barth, 176 Atl. 183,
the Court stated:
'' . . rrhe evidence offered necessarily
\Vas aimed at showing~ that the defendant
in his family life had been habituated to
an atmosphere of violence, firearins and
crime, and being so ha.bi tua ted, should not
be put to death for corrrrnitting murder in
the attempted perpetration of a robbery.
The necess.ary results of such reasoning
is that the \Vorse the early training, the
stronger the argument for a recommendation of mercy; and the professional gangster rearerl and schooled in crime, perhaps
convicted of eri1ne a dozen times previously} should be spared because of an unfortunate early training, where others,
more tenderly reared, go to the electric
. ''
c]1a1r.
Such an argument does not have the quality of
reasonableness, g·ood judgment or common sense.
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mental principle of our form of government, i. e.,
equality of all persons under the law.
Our statute under which the defendant, Markham,
was sentenced.
Section 103.-28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933,
:wa.s no doubt written as it is to guard against just
Buch a situation as existed at the trial of this case.
In framing and adopting this statute, it was no
doubt recognized that cases might arise wherein
the jury would misinterpret the evidence or its pur·
pose or permit mere sympathy to sway their judg~
ment, thus causing them to recommend leniency
when the evidence in the case did not warrant such
a recommendation. For this reason provision was
made giving to the court the discretion to de
termine what the sentence should be, irresp~ective
of any recommendation which the jury might make.
It is true that the jury's recommendation places
a great burden upon the trial judge to give it his
most careful and thoughtful consideration. But
having made a thorough study of the facts and evidence of the case, and given due weight to the
jury's recommendation, it is not merely the right
but it is the duty of the triat judge, if he is convinced in his own mind that such recommendation
is improper, to ignore it and impose su·ch sentence
as, in his best judg'ment, he £feels, p·rop:er. 'Tihe
statute places upon the tr:ial court the ultimate bur·
den of determining what the sentence shall be.
4

It is true that, in the instant case, the court dis
regarded the ju:ry's recommendation but, there is
no showing that he acted arbitrarily, cap·riciously,
or that his decision and judgment was contrary to
~eason or the evidence.
Hence, it is difficult to
conceive how it can properly be contended that the
4
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con rt erred silnply because he fearlessly performed
a duty placed upon hin1 by the statute, in the man .
ner which his judgment and conscience 'dictated.
Bearing in Inincl that, bec.ause of the nature of the
question presented by this appeal, the facts are the
things from which it must be ultin1ately determined
whether or not a court belo'v ha.s abused a dis .
cretionary power, it is believed the Court's atten~
tion should be called to a number of cases wherein
defendants have complained of excessive sentences
imposed by lower courts and vvherein the Appellate
·courts have refused to interfere 'vith and reduce
the sentences of the trial courts; and because of the
importance of the facts in determining whether
there ha.s been an abu?.e of discretion, vve have endeavored to give a con1prehensive picture o£ the
facts in the cases cited, in addition to the rulings
of the courts. For the same reason, it has been
deemed advisable to cite and set forth a. considerable number of cases so as to assist this Court in
obtaining for purposes of comparison a more broad
insight into the various circumstances and condi~
tions under which Appellate Courts have held tliat
the facts were not sufficient to warrant tlie- conclusion thflt trial courts had been guilty of an
abuse of judicial discretion.
In fue case of
State v. Olander, (Iovva, 1922'), 186 N. W. 53,
the facts sho""l\'':rl th:1t the deceased. 'vhile engaged
jn hjs duty as a merchant 'vas killed hv a shot from
a revolver held in the bands of the defendant while
he and two ·confederates were ·perpetrating a robbery. Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of murder and was sentenced to death. His confederates
had jury trials, were convicted and given sentences
of life imp·risonment. The back.gTound of the defendant in that case was remarkably similar to that
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of the defendant, Markham. He was 28 years old.
When he was quite young his father deserted the
family. When the defendant was about 15 years of
age, he stole some property of small value and was
sent to Industrial School, where he remained for
two or three years. Wheri paroled from that institution he worked at various places. He married
and had three young children. The Appellate Court
declined to reduce the sentence but concerning itg
power to do so, said:
''This power will~ be exercised only when
the court below ha·s manifestly visited too
severe a penalty - one disproportionate to
the degree of guilt as shown by the proof.
To justify the exercise of such power, it
must be made to appear that the punishment is excessive. There must be some
legal duty upon which to base its action in
reducing the sentence.''
In State v. Houston, 50 Iowa 512,
defendant wa.s convicted of murder in the second
degree and sentenced to 25 years iimprisolnment.
The victim was the defendant's father-in-law and
the relationship~ bet,veen them had been very unfriendly. Defendant's wife went to the victim's
house, where she was followed by the defendant,
who was refused admittance to the house, whereupon he broke through the door and killed the
victim. The A.ppellate Court refused to reduce tiie
penalty imposed. Because it contains what we believe to be a good statement of the p!roper function
of a.n Appellate Court in such cases, the following
is quoted from a concurring opinion in the Houston
case:
"In the absence of a jury trial and upon a
plea of guilty, the duty is cast upon the disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lQ

thus fixed in this ·case by the district court
"\Yas "\Yarranted by the record before it. The
record presented to us disclosed no mitigat·
ing facts. . . . Our jurisdiction in this case
is appellate only. We are not justified in
modifying the judgment below, unless there
be some reason for it apparent on the
record. . . . Our function is judicial; it
is ours to determine the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, and, if he is guilty, to
apply the p~enal statute in such case provided. We have no function of executive
clemency. Unless upon the record v;e can
differentiate the offense therein disclosed
from one of extreme cruelty, and can find
in the record mitigating reasons why the
extreme penalty should not in :this case
be imposed, then v;re are '\Vithout authority
to interfere at all with the judgment of the
trial court.
In State v. Smith (Iowa, 1905), 103 N. W.
769

'

defendant was charged with murder, entered a
plea of guilty and was sentenced to death. He
appealed, asserting only that the penalty was excessive. Said the Court:
''Code 8 ectio!l ,£728 provides, in substance
that whoever is guilty of murder in the
first degre·e shall be punished ,vith death
or imprisonment for life, as determined by
the court, if the defendant pleads guilty.
Manifestly, a large discretion is vested in
the trial court in such cases, and 've should
not interfere in the absence of a ~howing of
fl b11~e of that discretion.''
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In Alder v. State (1932, Okla..), 12 Pac.
(2d) 545,
defendant was tried for murder, interposed the defense of insanity, but was convicted and his punish·
ment fixed at death. He appealed, urging no error
at the trial but contending that the punishment
should be reduced to life imprisonment because
of his mental condition. The Court declined to
modify or reduce the penalty, using this language:
''Under the provisions of Section 2820 Comp. St., 1921, there is conferred on this
Court power to reverse, affirm or modify
the judgment appealed from. The right of
modification, however, is not unlimited. It
must, a.s a matter of law, be \vithin the limits of the punishment fixed by the statute
for the offense for which the accused was
convicted. It must further be· the exercise
of a judicial power, as .distinguished from
the executive power of commutation, reprieve, pardon or parole . . . Upon what
consi<;leration then shall this Court modify
the judgment~ Having regard for the law,
we cannot do so for reasons of sentiment
or sympathy; we can do so only if we can
say judicially that under the entire record
the punishment is too severe and that justice requires it be modified to life imprisonment '·
See also the later Oklahoma case,
Oliver v. State (1933), 23 Pac. (2d) 718.
In State v. Van Waters (Wash., 1904), 78
Pac. 897,
defendant was convicted of rape upon a person
under the age of consent and sentenced to imprisonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ment for a term of 25 years in the State peniten.
tiary. In refusing to reduce the sentence, the Court
stated:
''The sentence imposed by the court, \Vhile
within the limitations of the statute, seems
to us unnecessarily severe in the light of
the evidence. If 've felt that it was within
our recognized powers, we would direct a
modification of it, reducing the period to
five years. But our investigation led us
to doubt the authority of an Appellate
Court to reduce or rnodify a sentence which
is "-rithin the discretion of the trial court
to impose, and we n1ention the matter here
in the hop·e it may aid the app,ellant in inducing the pardoning power to exercise its
clemency in his behalf after he has served
a reasonable time."
See also, to the same effect,
~fay v. People (Colo., 192'5), 236 Pac. 1022
and
Briola v. People (Colo., 1925) 1 232 Pac. 924.
In the case of
M::n·qhall v. State, 74 Ga. 26,
defendant 'vas convicted of murder and sentenced
to death. On appeal it was urged that the sentence
was excessive and should be reduced. ·Said the
Appellate Court :
"It is discretionary vvith the judge, where
the jury fail to recommend otherwise, and
where the convictio~ is had solely upon
circumstantial evidence, to sentence to
death or to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, (Code Sec. 4323) and this
Court will rarely, if everr j11t.erfere with
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the exercise of this discretion. The case
must be an extreme one to induce or even
warrant the interference of thfs Court.''
See also
Daniel v. State, 118 Ga. 16; 43 S. E. 861,
holding that the refusal of the trial judge to follow
the recommendation of the jury, that one found
guilty of assault and battery with infent to murder
be punished as for a misdemeanor~ is not causo
for a new trial, such recommendation being entire·
ly subject to the approval of the Court under the
Georgia Penal Code of 1895, Section 1036.
Lancaster v. State, 18 S. W. 777,
is a Tennessee case wherein defendant was con·
victed of murder, the verdict of the jury being
''guilty of rnurder in the first degree with mitigating circumstances.'' Under the Tennessee Btatute
then in effect (Code Mill. and V., Section 6098)
where such a verdict was given the court was
authorized to ''adjudge a punishment short of
death. ' ' The trial court, however, sentenced the
defendant· to . die. Ap·peal was taken, one ground
urged being the abuse of discretion by the triaJ
judge. The Court in refusing to disturb the sen·
tence said:
''After prop·erly overruling motions for a
new trial and in arrest of judgment, the
trial judge pronounced sentence of death
npon the defendant, notwithstanding the
finding of mitigating circumstances by the
jury. He~tas authorized to do that, or to
commute th2 punishment from death to
imprisonment for life, as in his sound discretion and upon an unbiased and discriminating survey of the whole case, the hands
of justice might seem to demand. (Citing
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(~ode

Section and rases.) There 'vas no
abuse of that discretion in this ease. No
mitigating circun1stances are disclosed 1n
the record before us."
The Tennessee statute referred to,
Section 6098, Milliken and Vertrees, Code
of Tennessee, provides:
~·The

Court may also, 'vhere any person is
convicted of a capital offense, and the jury
who convicted him state in their verdict
that they are of the opinion that there are
mitigating circumstances in the case, commute the punishment from death to imprisonment for life in the penitentiary."
The same Court, in
Leach v. State (Tenn., 1897), 42 S. \V. 195,
wherein defendant was found guilty of 1nurde1
"with mitigating circumstances, n used this Ian·
g·uage:
"The jury's finding of 'mitigating circumstances' devolved upon the trial judge
tJH• important duty of deciding whether
the defendant should suffer · the death
penalty, or undergo imprisonment in the
State Prison for life. Whether one sentence or the other should be pronounced
"ras a matter of legal discretion \vith him.
(Citing Code Section and cases). Being
of the opinion that the proof disclosed no
mitigation of the crime, he, rightfully, pronounced the sentence of death ; and this
Court, concurring in t~at opinion, affirtns
the judgment.''
See also to the same effect
I~ouis v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 127.
Forrest v. State, 81 Tenn. ( 13 Lea) 103.
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In State v. Dooley (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W.
414}
defendant, a 16-year old boy was convicted of the
crime of murder and sentenced to die. His case
was appealed and among other matters his counsel
urged that the penalty was excessive, considerable
stress being placed upon the character, background
and past history of defendant. Said the Court:
''He was not an apt pupil, and his mental
develop,ment from lack of opportunity or
of natural ability seems to be a little inferior to the average development" of boys
of his age. . . . In view of the youth of
the defendant, his lack of mental developn1ent, and his almost uniformly good conduct before the crime was committed, we
should have been better satisfied had the
jury designated imprisonment in the penitentiary for life as his punishment; but
in a l'egal sense, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the punishment designated and there is no sufficient ground
upon which we can prevent it.''
In Muller v. State (Wis., 1932), 243 N. W.
411,
defendant was convicted of embezzlement and making false entries with intenf to defraud. On appeal
he contended that the sentence of three to six years
which was given him wa.s excessive but the Court
declined to reduce the penalty, saying:
'' Comp,laint is made that the sentences imposed are excessive. They are clearly
within the statutes which provide punishment for embezzlement and false entries.
Section 343.20 and 321.39. While there are
circumstances which might have justified
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
greater leniency 7 \Ye are \vithout pow·er to
reduce the sentence.''
The Wisconsin statutes empower the Appellate
Court, where it believes that there has been an in
justice done, to
''reverse the judgn1ent and direct the trial
court to Inake the proper judgment in the
case.''
To the same effect are
(}ald,vin v. Comm. (Ky., 1933), 57 S. W.
(2d) 487, and
State v. Johnson, (S. C., 1930), 156 S. E.
353.
In State v. Casey (0-re., 192'3), 217 I)ac. 632 7
defendant was convicted of murder in the first de·
gree. He H.ppealed, admitting the evidence was
sufficient to establish his guilt bat called attention
to the fact that another defendant "\Vas acquitted
on the same evidence upon which defendant was
s~ntenced to death. He requested that the penalty
be reduced. The Court said:
''The defendant, in effect, asks us to commute his sentenc.e from the extreine penalty of the la'v to life imprisonment. We
are not empo\vered to commute or to pardon. Such authority is vested by our Con·
stitution in the executive power, and not
the judiciary. Casey's crime has been
measured by the law of the land . and that
la"r condemns him."
The Oregon statute, governing the power of the
Appellate Court,
Section 557, Olson's Oregon Laws, 1920,
reads:
"Upon the appeal the Appellate Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

may affirm, reverse or modify the judgment or decree appealed from.''
In State v. Schaffer (IVIont., 1921), 19'7
Pac. 986,
defendant was convicted of sedition, the jury leav·
ing the- penalty to be fixed by the court which
assessed a fine of $12,000. Defendant appealed,
contending among other things, that the penalty
was excessive.
Section 8805, .Revised Codes of Montana.
1921~

states with regard to Appellate Powers of the
Supreme Court :
''The Supreme Court may affirm, reverse
or modify any judgment or order appealed
from, and may direet the proper judgment
or order to be entered, or direct a new trial
or further proceedings to be had.''
In refusing to reduce the penalty imposed in tho
Schaffer case the Court stated:
"That the punishment placed upon the defendant a burden greater than he ought to
have been made to bear is a matter we n1ay
not consider. The record being free from
error, this Court has no power to revise the
sentence nor to modify the judgment,
though the penalty imposed may seem
greater than the offender deserved. Relief can only be had through the executive
bran-ch of the government.''
To the same effect is
State v. Fo,vlee (Mont., 1921), 196 Pac. 992.
Gurera v. lTnited States, 40 Federal (2d)
:iBS!
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit, expresses the Federal rule with regard to
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reduction by an Appellate Court of a sentence of
a lower tribunal, in these words:
"If there is one rule in the :b'cdernl criminal practice which is firmly established,
it is that the Appellate Court has no control over a sentence 'vhich is "\Vitllin the
lin1its allowed by statute."
I._

The final case to which we desire to call the Court's
attention is:
State v. Junkins (1910, Io\\ra), 126 N. ·w.
689,
wherein defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree and sentenced to die. In appealing to
the Io,va Supreme Court, defendant's counsel contended that the punishment was too severe and
limited their plea to a request for reduction of the
sentence to life imprisonment, the argument urged
in support thereof being that defendant was a de .
genera.te who, because
''of a defective organization moulded by
pre-natal limitations and developed in
~,Ticion s environments for which he is not
~--r 0 P''·n~ih1e, is also incapable of apprecia.ting moral or social obligations.''
Because the contentions of the defendant's ·counsel
in that case are so similar to those of counsel for
apl>ellant in the case no'v before this Court, and because the views of the Iowa Court coincide so closely with the contentions and belief of the State in
this case, I quote at length from the de-cision of
the Court:
''Nor does the evidence 1nake such a showing of appellant's defective mental and
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moral capacity as to permit this Court to
interfere ·with the verdict. He had received
some degree of education and was able to
read and vvrite. He app·ears to have known
how to perform acceptable manual labor
when disposed to do it. While a slave to
drink and drugs, his faculties were not so
obscured on the evening of his awful crilne
but that he remembered and related the
circumstances attending it, and the disposition made by him of the booty taken
fro1n the body of his victim. It may be, as
counsel suggest, that he is the natural and
inevitable p-roduct of 'Smoky Row' and the
slums of the city . . . As no\V constituted,
the la\v ordinarily observes only the overt
criminal act of the rational individual and
punishes it without a.ttemp~ting to trace the
criminal impulse or inclination to its origin.
People are born and reared under circumstances varying from wealth, comfort and
wholesome examples and influences on the
one hand, to poverty, misery, and surroundings of the most unfa:vorable and corrupting character on the other, but all are made
subject to the same law and each must
render to it the same measure of obedience.
This is so because such are our human
limitations that a finer discrimination and
a juster apportionment of responsibility
is apparently impossjble, until we lia.ve
reached a higher plane of civilization than
has yet been achieved. The appellant has
been fairly tried under the law as it exists,
and we find nothing in the general merits
of thr case a's disclosed by the record which
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authorizes us to disturb the verdict or
judgment.''
That the Io,va Supren1c Court has the power to reduce punishment inflicted bv the district court is
asserted by that Court in ·
State v. Allen & Allen, 32 IoV\ra 248.
State v. Freeman, 27 Io,va 333,
in both of which cases the Court refused to reduce
the sentences imposed by courts below. See also
State v. Wilmoth, ~3 Iowa 380.
State v. Davenport, 149 Iowa 294.
State v. Nolta, ~18 N. W. 144.
State v. Bamsey, 22·3 N. W. 873.
wherein the Iowa Supreme Court refused to reduce
punishments impoE:ed by lower courts.
The case here before this Court then resolves itself
~imply into this situation:
Ap·pellant, John Markham, a man whose degree or
mentality may be below normal, deliberately
planned to rob the deceased!' a n1an 'vhom he had
kno,vn for some time and \vith \Vhom his relations,
so far as the record sho,vs, were friendly. Defendant had no provocation to commit the crime,
was under no irresistible pressure to do so, and
had no motive except to enrich himself. He a.nned
himself with a lethal weapon - an iron pipe - so
that he was prepared to kill if necessary to the
a.ccomplishmen t of the robbery. There is no pretense that he armed himself for protection. His
purposes \Yere 'vholly aggressive. The robbery was
perpetrated, though with some difficulty, during
the course of which defendant did murder his
victim.
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Section 103-2.8-3 Revised· Statutes of ·utah,
1933,
provides that every murder committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a.ny robbery
is murder in the first degree.
Section 103 28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, p-rovides that :
''Every pers-on guilty of murder in the
first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the
recommendation of the jury, may be imprisoned at hard labor in the State prison
for life, in the dis·cretion of the~ court. . . ..,
So that in the last analysis, it is clearly and unmistakably the province of the trial judge to determine what the sentence shall be, regardless of
the recommendation of the jury. The defendant
admits this right exists in the trial judge but he
comes before this Court and sa.ys,· in effect:
' 'I killed a man while in the p~erpetra tion
of a robbery; a jury found me t,ruilty of the
crime of murder and recommended life imprisonment. But the judge, in exercising
a right given him by statute, sentenced me
to die. If I were a person of normal and
average intelligence, then it- would be
proper that I die for my crime. I am not
insane ; I was not compelled by any
irresistible force to commit the crime; I
knew the difference between right and
. wrong; but I am not quife so bright as the
average 'individual. Hence, I should not
suffer a prenalty so severe as death, and
the action of the trial court, which would
have been proper if I were of normal
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n1entality, show·s such an abuse of judicial
discretion as to amount to error, warranting interfer\)nce of this Court.''
It is our sincere belief that there is nothing in law
nor in common sense to support such a contention
of the defendant MarkhaJn. Defendant asks this
Court to be merciful, where he showed no mercy
for his victim or his victim's family. However de·
fective he may be in the attributes which make up
a normal human being, he is not so lacking in
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong
or in power to resist the pleadings of criminal impulses as to justify a miJtigr.ttion of _the punishment which \Yould justly be imposed up·on him- if
1he were the equal of the average man in resp~ect to
those qualities. If punishment by death may evet
be justified, a more fitting case for such punish·
ment than th·e one before this C-ourt is difficult to
. .
Imagine.
The case is one wherein the trial judge, after carefully considering the facts and evidence produced
at the trial, concluded that the recommendation of
the jury was improper and in the exercise of a
discretion specifically given him by statute, passed
a sentence contrary to such recommendation. It
must have been a difficult thing for the court to
do. Perhaps thiB Court might not have done the
same thing under similar circumstances, but there
is nothing in the record to show that the court
abused its discretionary powers by acting arbitrarBy, capriciously and without reason, or contrary to
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tention of the State, which we believe is abundantJy fortified by the record in this case and the rule~
laid down in the cases referred to in this brief that
it is not a rnatter with which this Court can interfere.
Accordingly, we resp~ectfully submit that no error
was committed by the court below; that this Court
cannot properly disturb the judgment of the court
belo"\\ and that such judgment and sentence should
be affirmed.
7

;

Respectfully submitted,

GROVER A. GILE·S,
Attorney General of Utah
ZAR E. HAYES,
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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